Making Memory Account Accountable: Analyzing and Detecting Memory Missing-account bugs for Container Platforms

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ABSTRACT
Linux kernel introduces the memory control group (memcg) to account and confine memory usage at the process-level. Due to its flexibility and efficiency, memcg has been widely adopted by container platforms and has become a fundamental technique. While being critical, memory accounting is prone to missing-account bugs due to the diverse memory accounting interfaces and the massive amount of allocation/free paths. To our knowledge, there is still no systematic analysis against the memory missing-account problem, with respect to its security impacts, detection, etc.

In this paper, we present the first systematic study on the memory missing-account problem. We first perform an in-depth analysis of its exploitability and security impacts on container platforms. We then develop a tool named MANTA (short for Memory Accounting Analyzer), which combines both static and dynamic analysis techniques to detect and validate memory missing-account bugs automatically.

Our analysis shows that all container runtimes, including runC and Kata container, are vulnerable to memory missing-account-based attacks. Moreover, memory missing-account can be exploited to attack the Docker, the CaaS, and the FaaS platforms, leading to memory exhaustion, which crashes individual node or even the whole cluster. Our tool reports 53 exploitable memory missing-account bugs, 37 of which were confirmed by kernel developers with the corresponding patches submitted, and two new CVEs are assigned. Through the in-depth analysis, automated detection, the reported bugs and the submitted patches, we believe our research improves the correctness and security of memory accounting for container platforms.

CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Operating systems security; Virtualization and security.

KEYWORDS
Cloud infrastructure, Linux kernel, memory accounting, missing-account, DoS attack

1 INTRODUCTION
Accounting and limiting memory usage is a core functionality of every operating system kernel. In particular, Linux kernel introduces the memory control group (memcg), which can account and limit memory usage at the process-level. Therefore, compared with virtual-machine (VM) based memory partition techniques, memcg is more fine-grained and lightweight.

Due to its flexibility and efficiency, memcg has been widely adopted by container platforms. It is known that container platforms rely on resource sharing heavily to improve the utilization of their hardware resources. While memcg provides the only way to
account and limit the memory usage of containers at the process-level. As a result, popular container platforms, such as Docker [17], the Container-as-a-Service platform (e.g., OpenShift) [23], and the Function-as-a-Service platform (e.g., OpenWhisk) [30], all adopt memcg to control the memory usage of their containers. Moreover, even the VM-based container runtime—Kata container [3] also uses memcg to limit the memory of container threads and other service threads on the host machine. Besides, Open Container Initiative (OCI) certification requires that container runtimes must use memcg in order to be certified [4]. Therefore, memcg has become a fundamental technique for container platforms and cloud computing.

Unfortunately, while being widely used, memcg is error-prone due to its complex nature. Specifically, Linux kernel chooses to insert memory accounting interfaces into the memory allocation/free paths to realize accounting, which may easily introduce memory missing-account (the allocated memory is not accounted) bugs due to the highly complicated memory usage and the massive number of memory usage-related interfaces and code paths. Moreover, even if the accounting interfaces are in the correct positions, their accounting behaviors are conditional and controlled by the accounting flags, which we find is often missing. Consequently, we find that memory missing-account bugs are common.

However, even memcg has been used widely, its memory missing-account bugs have never been analyzed systematically. The status quo of memcg resulted from two causes. First, it has never been clear what security impacts memory missing-account bugs would incur or whether they are exploitable at all. As a result, memory-account bugs were ignored by kernel developers, and no particular efforts have been put into eliminating these problems. Second, there is no automated detection of memory missing-account bugs. As previously discussed, memory accounting design and implementation are complex and deeply integrated into the complicated memory management subsystem of Linux kernel. As a result, it is hard to understand the accounting design and policy correctly, even for experienced users. For example, we find that the Docker official website mistakenly claims that “memory charge is split between the control groups” for the page cache, and that “when a cgroup is terminated, it could increase the memory usage of another cgroup” [17]. As a result, without the automated detection, it is virtually impossible to reason about the correctness of memory accounting manually. Even worse, whether memory missing-account bugs are detectable and how it can be detected are still open questions.

This paper thus conducts the first systematic analysis and detection against the Linux memory missing-account bugs. We first perform an in-depth analysis to understand the exploitability and security impacts of the memory missing-account bugs on container platforms. We then develop a tool named MANTA (short for Memory Accounting Analyzer), which combines both static and dynamic analysis techniques to automatically detect memory missing-account bugs. Our analysis shows that not only normal container runtimes (e.g., runc), but also secure container runtimes (e.g., Kata container) are vulnerable to memory exhaustion attacks caused by memory missing-account bugs. Even worse, memory missing-account bugs can be exploited to attack the Docker, the CaaS, and the FaaS platforms, which crashes container nodes or even the whole cluster.

Given the complexity of memcg, memory missing-account detection faces two challenges. First, there is no documentation nor existing study defining memory accounting interfaces used by memcg. Existing works [20, 37] adopt natural language processing or wrapper function analysis to identify memory allocation interfaces. However, these techniques cannot apply to accounting interface directly due to unmatched heuristics. To address the problem, MANTA proposes the counter-based interface identification to detect all memory accounting related interfaces automatically. The key observation is that all memory accounting interfaces finally increase/decrease corresponding page counters in their implementation. The identification starts from page counter modification and iterates on the whole call graph to identify accounting interfaces precisely.

Second, it is challenging to analyze the mappings between memory allocation and memory accounting. Such analysis is complicated by the deep and nested execution paths from memory allocation sites to memory accounting sites. It also needs to trace the data flow between the allocated pages and the accounted pages to get the correct alias-set. Moreover, the accounting could be conditional due to the control of conditional flags. Accordingly, MANTA proposes the alloc-charging mapping analysis and accounting flag analysis to address this challenge. Besides, to validate the detected memory missing-account bugs, MANTA further employs Linux Test Project to examine their triggerability and impacts.

With MANTA, we detect and report 53 exploitable bugs in memcg, 37 of which have been confirmed by kernel developers with patches that are either merged or pending for merging. The reported bugs got two new CVEs (one is pending). In summary, this work conducts an in-depth investigation that not only analyzes the exploitability and impacts but also systematically detects memory missing-account bugs. We believe the findings help kernel memcg developers improve memory accounting in the future. This paper makes the following contributions.

- **In-depth analysis of exploitability and impacts.** We design new attacks to exploit the memory missing-account problems on container platforms. Our attacks show that memory missing-account bugs can be easily exploited to attack both normal and secure container runtimes (i.e., runc and Kata container) and popular container platforms (i.e., Docker, OpenShift, and OpenWhisk), leading to container nodes or even the whole cluster crashes.

- **Automated detection with new techniques.** We propose multiple analysis techniques to effectively detect memory missing-account bugs, integrating both static analysis and dynamic validation. We implement the detection based on LLVM and evaluate it with the Linux memory accounting. We further use Linux Test Project (LTP) to validate the triggerability of the detected bugs.

- **Community impact.** We detect and report 53 exploitable memory missing-account bugs in Linux v5.10, 37 of which are confirmed by kernel developers. Two new CVEs are assigned (one is pending). Our findings raise awareness of missing-account impacts in the kernel community who also invited us to test their downstream kernels. We plan to open-source our detection tool to further help the community to improve the correctness and security of memory accounting.

**Ethical considerations.** All the experiments and attacks in this paper are conducted on a dedicated physical machine, which is used solely by us. We responsibly disclosed all detected bugs to the Linux community.
As such, the memory limits on the parent node also affect all children nodes. There are two versions of memcg: v1 and v2. Their differences are mainly on hierarchical structures and user interfaces [34], with roughly the same implementations on accounting. Both of them are in use currently. This paper refers to cgroups v1, and most conclusions also hold on cgroups v2.

### Data structures

The core data structure for memcg is mem_cgroup, as shown in Figure 1, which represents a memcg instance. memcg contains 4 page counters, corresponding to 4 types of accounted memory as previously discussed. Each page counter uses usage (Line 14) to count the number of allocated pages. While the total memory limit in pages is set in max (Line 16). At the memory charging, Linux kernel calls charging interfaces which in turn calls page_counter_try_charge, a function computing the total usage (Line 24) and checking it with the max limit (Line 25).

#### Accounting challenges

Accounting memory usage correctly in Linux kernel is very challenging due to numerous memory allocation interfaces and massive allocation paths in Linux kernel. It is difficult to mediate all memory allocation paths, and thus the current accounting mechanism is error-prone.

### 2.2 Container Runtimes and Platforms

Memcg can account and limit memory usage at per-process level. Compared with virtual-machine (VM) based memory control techniques, memcg is more fine-grained, lightweight, and flexible. Therefore, memcg has been widely adopted by Docker, the Container-as-a-Service (CaaS) and Function-as-a-Service (Faas) platforms. Specifically, CaaS platforms provide users with provisioned container instances. Users on a CaaS platform can create/start/stop/delete containers with customized container images. On the other hand, instead of giving the users container instances, Faas platforms allow users to input a function and triggering rules, and creates container instances automatically to execute the input function.

Docker and CaaS/Faas platforms usually use the native container runtime (i.e., runC) for container instances. To improve the isolation among containers, people propose the secure container runtimes, such as gVisor and Kata container. gVisor is a sandboxed container runtime developed by Google. It runs each container on a user-space kernel called Sentry. Sentry intercepts and handles most syscalls from containers. Therefore, Sentry reduces the syscalls invoked on the host kernel from containers. Besides the sandboxed runtime, the container community also proposed to use virtualization to isolate container instances. One such virtualized container runtime is Kata container [24], in which each container instance runs in a micro-VM for strong isolation.

Our experiments show that both normal and secure container runtimes, including runC and Kata container, are vulnerable to memory exhaustion attacks caused by missing-account bugs. Moreover, memory missing-account bugs can be exploited to attack the Docker, the CaaS and the Faas platforms, leading to memory exhaustion, which crashes individual nodes or even the whole cluster.

### 3 A STUDY OF EXPLOITABILITY AND IMPACT

The impact of memory missing-account bugs in production environments have never been systematically studied. They were generally considered as a less-harmful correctness issue, instead...
3.1 Threat Model and Assumptions

In our experiments, we consider three container platforms—Docker, the Container-as-a-Service (CaaS) platform, and the Function-as-a-Service (FaaS) platform. We use the widely deployed CaaS platform—OpenShift as our CaaS platform and the popular OpenWhisk as our FaaS platform. These three platforms use the native runtime (i.e., runC) as their container runtime. All containers on these three platforms are set up as non-privileged with default capabilities [2] and seccomp configurations [18]. For the Docker and CaaS platforms, users can create and start containers provisioned with self-defined images through cloud-provided interfaces. This is reasonable for all cloud vendors, including AWS, Google Cloud, and Azure, provide a console for users to manage the container instances [11]. For FaaS platforms, users can define, deploy, and trigger functions, where each function instance runs in a container.

The attacker is a malicious user using Docker, CaaS, and FaaS platforms. He/She can execute arbitrary code inside unprivileged containers. However, the capability of the container is restricted by the default capabilities. To further limit the attacker, we assume that attackers cannot escape from containers nor escalate their privileges. The attackers’ goal is to break the limit of memory accounting and exhaust all memory on the host machine to crash other containers, functions or the host machine.

For the attacking environments, we set up the Docker on a local machine, while set up OpenShift and OpenWhisk clusters on Google Cloud. For ethical considerations, the cluster is built on a dedicated bare metal server provided by Google Cloud that is only used by us, and thus will not impact other users.

3.2 Exploit Missing-Account Problem

In this section, we design new attacks to exploit the missing-account problem in memory accounting to understand its impact. As previously discussed, current memory accounting in the Linux kernel places memory accounting interfaces on the memory allocation paths and memory unaccounting interfaces on the memory free paths. However, Linux memory management is complex, containing thousands of memory allocation and free paths. It is hard to mediate all of them with the correct interfaces. Especially, it is very easy to miss one memory allocation paths, leading to the missing-account problem.

Figure 2 shows a missing-account bug on semaphore objects and semaphore arrays in the kernel, detected by MANTA and confirmed by the Linux developer. The function sem_alloc allocates a set of semaphores and uses sem_array to index them. The allocation site at Line 8 calls kvzalloc to allocate memory for sem_array and semaphores. The kernel only accounts for the allocated memory when __GFP_ACCOUNT flag is set in the third parameter of kvzalloc. However, the call to kvzalloc at Line 8 does not specify the __GFP_ACCOUNT flag, leading to missing-account on the allocated semaphores and sem_array. Moreover, sem_alloc is called by the semget system call to allocate semaphores. As a result, this missing-account bug can be easily triggered from the user space. We further design new attacks to show that the above bug can be exploited to break the container memory confinement and exhaust all host memory.

3.2.1 Attacking Docker. We set up the Docker with default capabilities and seccomp configurations. The semget system call does not require any capabilities and is not blocked by the container seccomp profile either. Therefore, in our experiments, the attacking program in a non-privileged container can trigger semget system call repeatedly to break the memory accounting limit and exhaust all host memory. The host machine even crashes due to the out-of-memory error. We reported the above bug and submitted patches to Linux community. The patches have been merged to Linux mainline and a new CVE is assigned to us.

3.2.2 Attacking the CaaS Platform. We set up a self-managed OpenShift cluster on Google Cloud, running all GCP VM instances. The cluster allows users to create containers on a node with 15GB memory and Linux kernel v5.14.14. We set the memory limit for the
We further design new at

The guest kernel forwards the request to virtio-fsd daemon. virtio-fsd allocates Posix locks on the host machine.

Kata VM

Malicious pod

Guest kernel

Host machine

Figure 4: Exploiting missing-account bugs to attack Kata containers.

container to 128MB, which is a popular memory size used in public cloud.

To launch the attack, the malicious user creates a container with normal user privilege and allocates a large number of semaphores inside the container. As shown in Figure 3, the memory usage of the malicious container increases rapidly and reaches the node’s limit in around 20 seconds. In contrast, the charged memory usage for the attacker is extremely low, less than 1.4MB. As a result, the malicious container breaks the 128MB memory limit and consumes all 15GB memory on the host machine. The victim container on the same node cannot perform any operations due to the lack of memory.

3.2.3 Attacking the FaaS Platform. We evaluate the attack on Open-Whisk, a popular open-source FaaS platform served as the infrastructure of IBM Cloud Functions [15]. The cluster node contains 15GB memory and runs Linux kernel v5.11.0-1021-gcp. The memory limit for each function is set to 128MB.

To launch the attack, the malicious user creates a function which consume semaphores repeatedly. Next, the malicious user triggers the malicious functions repeatedly. As a result, the memory on the node is exhausted rapidly. Note that when a node’s memory is exhausted, consecutive malicious functions will be dispatched to other nodes. As a result, the memory of all nodes in the cluster is exhausted by the malicious users, leading to a cluster-level DoS.

3.2.4 Attacking the Secure Runtime. We further design new attacks to evaluate memory missing-account impacts on the secure runtime—Kata container. Our experiment shows that memory missing-account bugs allow attackers to break the isolation of Kata container and attack the host machine and other container instances.

Kata container is a virtualized container runtime, in which each container instance runs in a micro-VM for strong isolation. However, Kata micro-VM forwards file operations to the host machine, which makes it vulnerable to the memory missing-account-based attack. More specifically, by exploiting memory missing-account bugs, attackers can exhaust host memory from the Kata container within the micro-VM. As shown in Figure 4, the malicious user is a normal user inside a container and issues fcnt1 syscalls to allocate a huge number of POSIX locks on a set of files. The guest kernel, however, forwards the request to the virtio-fsd daemon running on the host. Therefore, the daemon allocates POSIX locks in the host kernel. Although the memory usage of virtio-fsd daemon is limited by memcg, the memory used by lock objects is missing accounted.

As a result, the malicious container can exhaust all physical memory on the host machine. We reported this attack to the Kata Container community. They confirmed this problem and are applying a new CVE for us.

3.3 Discussion

As demonstrated by the above attacks, the missing-account bugs can be exploited to attack both normal and secure container runtimes, Docker, and CaaS/FaaS platforms. The attacker can exploit these bugs to exhaust all memory and crash container nodes or even the whole cluster. Even worse, the attack requires only normal user privilege and thus are easy to launch. Though memory missing-account bugs can be exploited to attack container platforms, there is no systematic study to detect and eliminate the bugs. Therefore, this paper proposes the first memory accounting analysis tool named MANTA, to detect these problems systematically.

4 MISSING-ACCOUNT BUG DETECTION

Given the criticalness of memory missing-account bugs, it is important to detect these problems at an early stage before OS kernels actually run in production scenario. Unfortunately, there is no tool that can detect missing-account bugs with both high code coverage and high precision. Therefore, we propose the MANTA (short for Memory Accounting Analyzer) to automate the memory missing-account bug detection.

Design goals. MANTA aims to automatically and systematically detect memory missing-account bugs by analyzing the correctness of accounting interface placement. Specifically, MANTA needs to detect the memory missing-account bugs with high code coverage. To achieve this, MANTA leverages static analysis to traverse all memory allocation/free paths in Linux kernel. Moreover, MANTA needs to detect the bugs with high precision. Therefore, MANTA uses dynamic validation to test the dynamical triggerability of the detected bugs.

Challenges. To achieve both goals, MANTA needs to overcome the following challenges.
int __memcg_kmem_charge(struct mem_cgroup *memcg, gfp_t gfp, unsigned int nr_pages)
{
    struct page_counter *counter;
    if (!cgroup_subsys_on_dfl(memory_cgrp_subsys) &&
        !page_counter_try_charge(memcg->kmem, nr_pages, &counter))
        return 0;
    ...
    bool page_counter_try_charge(struct page_counter *counter,
        unsigned long nr_pages, struct page_counter **fail)
    {
        struct page_counter *c;
        for (c = counter; c; c = c->parent) {
            long new;
            new = atomic_long_add_return(nr_pages, &c->usage);
        }
    }

    int __memcg_kmem_charge_page(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp, int order)
    {
        struct mem_cgroup *memcg;
        int ret = 0;
        memcg = get_mem_cgroup_from_current();
        ...
        ret = __memcg_kmem_charge(memcg, gfp, 1 << order);
        if (!ret) {
            page->mem_cgroup = memcg;
            ...
        }
    }

Figure 6: Counter-based memcg interface identification. Use page_counter to detect charging/uncharging interfaces.

- C1. MANTA needs to identify the memory accounting interfaces, which are not described in kernel documents nor studied by previous work. Existing interface identification methods for memory allocation [20, 37] cannot be applied, as their heuristic does not work for memory accounting interfaces.

- C2. MANTA needs to decide for each memory allocation whether it is accounted and only accounted once. However, the execution paths from memory allocation sites to memory accounting sites tend to be deep, nested, and interleaved in Linux kernel. Moreover, even when such a path exists, the accounting can also be affected by conditional flags as the accounting requires both the accounting interface and the accounting flags §2.

Analysis techniques and workflow. The architecture of MANTA is shown in Figure 5. With the whole kernel IR as the input, MANTA first generates the kernel call graph. It then uses a page-counter-based method to identify all accounting interfaces to address C1 (§4.1). Based on accounting interfaces, MANTA builds the mapping between memory allocation/free and memory accounting (§4.2). After that, MANTA uses accounting flag analysis to further analyze the kernel memory accounting (§4.3). These two techniques address C2. With the detected memory accounting bugs, MANTA further evaluates each bug with our dynamic triggerability analysis based on thousands of test cases from Linux Test Project (§4.4). MANTA is currently implemented for Linux memory accounting. In the following, we present the details of each analysis technique.

4.1 Counter-based Interface Identification

MANTA first needs to identify the memory accounting interfaces. Such interfaces are diverse and can be custom. Existing techniques [20, 37] that use natural language processing (NLP) or wrapper function analysis would suffer from precision issues. We observe that memory accounting has to maintain memory usage counters (i.e., page_counter), which are operated through specific atomic functions. Memory usage counters can be easily located using type matching. Therefore, by identifying the primitive functions that are used for increasing/decreasing these counters, MANTA can automatically find out all functions that perform increasing/decreasing operations against accounting counters.

Specifically, MANTA walks through each kernel IR instruction and checks whether it increases/decreases page_counter. If so, MANTA marks the function that directly contains the instruction as a basic accounting function. Because in Linux kernel, page_counter is solely used by memcg, our approach can achieve high accuracy. MANTA then identifies accounting interfaces based on basic accounting functions. MANTA uses DFS to traverse backward from basic accounting functions and marks all visited functions on the kernel call graph. MANTA stops the traverse whenever it reaches a function outside the memcg subsystem because it cannot be a memcg interface. Among these marked functions that account memory usage, if a function is invoked from the outside of the memcg subsystem, i.e., source files defining memcg functionalities, MANTA marks it as an accounting interface. In this way, MANTA can identify all accounting interfaces.

Let’s use the example in Figure 6 to illustrate the steps in counter-based interface identification. First, MANTA traverses all basic blocks of all kernel functions. In __memcg_kmem_charge, it identifies page_counter function (Line 6) and double confirms the first argument is from a memcg. After that, MANTA steps into the page_counter_try_charge and finds that it increases a field of page_counter. As __memcg_kmem_charge calls the page_counter function directly and increases the page_counter value, MANTA concludes that __memcg_kmem_charge is a basic charging interface. Similarly, for the interfaces that decrease the page_counter value, MANTA marks them as uncharging interfaces. Moreover, MANTA can distinguish interfaces for different memory types, as memcg uses different page_counters for each memory type (§2). At Line 6, page_counter_try_charge uses memcg->kmem and MANTA thus knows __memcg_kmem_charge is for kernel memory accounting.

Starting from the basic charging interfaces, MANTA then walks up along the call chain to incrementally identify all charging interface wrappers. If a function calls the basic charging interfaces and the charging amount is from its arguments, MANTA will mark it as a charging interface wrapper. Use the same example in Figure 6. __memcg_kmem_charge_page calls the basic charging interface __memcg_kmem_charge (Line 29), while the charging amount 1 << order is controlled by the arguments of __memcg_kmem_charge_page. Therefore, MANTA considers __memcg_kmem_charge_page as a charging wrapper because it merely passes the charging amount to the basic charging interface and has no control over the charging amount. MANTA uses the same approach to detect uncharging wrappers.

With the charging/uncharging interfaces, MANTA also needs to identify memory allocation/free interfaces. MANTA adopts existing techniques [20, 39] to produce the initial results. Moreover, on observing that memory allocation/free interfaces increase/decrease the nr_free counter of struct free_area, MANTA uses a similar counter-based approach to increase the precision of the result.
4.2 Alloc-Charging Mapping Analysis

Intuitively, each allocated object should be accounted exactly once. Otherwise, the object can be missing-accounted. Therefore, the next step of MANTA is to build the relationship between memory allocation/free and charging/uncharging. Based on the relationship, MANTA can then identify cases that charge less or uncharge more than allocated/freed memory as missing-account bugs. For brevity, we focus on allocation and charging. The same technique can be applied to analyze free-uncharging mapping.

It is non-trivial to analyze the mapping among allocation and charging from source code because of deeply nested calling relationships and complex memory pointer propagation. To address these problems, we develop the alloc-charging mapping analysis. The basic idea is to first summarize the memory allocation and charging within a function as its function summary, and then build the memory alloc-charging mapping based on function summaries to detect missing-account bugs. More specifically, we use access-path-based analysis to generate per-function summary. The concept of access path is first used in SATURN framework [40] to express per-function summary for escaped objects (i.e., the object pointer is leaked out of the current function).

As shown by the left-side algorithm in Figure 7, MANTA first generates function summaries for all functions (Line 2). Next, for a function \( f \), by gathering function summaries of its callees and analyzing the memory allocation sites (isAlloc), MANTA can build the alloc-charging mapping for all non-escaped objects within \( f \) (Line 4-9). Specifically, MANTA substitutes the variables in callee summaries with arguments passed to the callee to calculate the allocated pages in \( f \), which is called origin-aware tracing. Then MANTA analyzes alloc-charge mapping inside \( f \) by calling CheckPage (Line 12).

In CheckPage, MANTA is able to report the missing-account bugs for non-escaped objects (Line 19). For the escaped objects from \( f \) (Line 14-18), they will be handled in a function (such as the caller of \( f \)) eventually as all functions in the kernel are traversed (Line 3-10). Moreover, both isCharged (Line 13) and isDupCharged functions (Line 21) conduct a data-flow analysis to connect the local objects to the return values or the parameters of the callee functions. In this way, we can trace a kernel object’s charging state inter-procedurally using function summaries of callees.

We use the concrete example in the right side of Figure 7 to demonstrate the algorithm. MANTA first generates summary for the bottom memory allocation function __alloc_pages_nodemask (Line 1). MANTA identifies that page is returned by a lower function get_page_from_freelist (Line 4), charged (Line 6), and returned (Line 8). Therefore, page is both escaped and charged, and the function summary should be (__alloc_pages_nodemask, retval, retval). When MANTA analyzes do_anonymous_page at Step 3, it fetches the function summary of alloc_zeroed_user_highpage_movable, which is a wrapper of __alloc_pages_nodemask and has the same summary. MANTA identifies that page in do_anonymous_page is already charged according to the function summary (Line 14). When analyzing alloc-charging mapping inside do_anonymous_page, MANTA finds that the memory accounting at Line 18 is reachable from Line 14 and that page could be charged again at Line 18. As a result, MANTA reports a redundant-account warning in this case. On the other hand, if a page is not charged in the current function and does not escape, MANTA reports a missing-account bug.

4.3 Accounting Flag Analysis

We find that the mapping of allocation and charging sites alone is not sufficient for detecting missing-account bugs because memory
Table 1: Summary of recall evaluation. SA denotes \texttt{SLAB\_ACCOUNT} flag, GKA denotes \texttt{GFP\_KERNEL\_ACCOUNT} flag.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Affected Alloc.</th>
<th>Removed Flag</th>
<th>Detected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>kernel/cred.c:687</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>kernel/cred.c:217</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>kernel/cred.c:258</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>kernel/delayacct.c:36</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>kernel/fork.c:170</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>kernel/fork.c:1508</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>fs/exec.c:1190</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>kernel/fork.c:1556</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>fs/file.c:293</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>fs/fs_struct.c:114</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>kernel/fork.c:1064</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
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<td>Y</td>
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<td>kernel/fork.c:348</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>kernel/utsname.c:34</td>
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<td>Y</td>
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<td>security/security.c:533</td>
<td>GKA</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>kernel/groups.c:21</td>
<td>GKA</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>kernel/groups.c:23</td>
<td>GKA</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

charging is often conditional. In particular, Linux kernel accounts
kernel object memory only when a \texttt{\_GFP\_ACCOUNT} flag is passed to
the accounting interfaces. Therefore if the \texttt{\_GFP\_ACCOUNT} flag is not
provided, a memory accounting interface will still not account
the memory. As a result, analyzing the values of accounting flags is
critical to detecting missing-account bugs. MANTA thus conducts
the accounting flag analysis to determine whether accounting flag
\texttt{\_GFP\_ACCOUNT} is passed to accounting interfaces.

Bit-wise and inter-procedural analysis. MANTA adopts an
inter-procedural bit-wise data-flow tracing approach to achieve
accounting flag analysis. First, at the charging-site, MANTA checks
whether the GFP flag itself is a constant. If yes, MANTA directly
checks the bit of \texttt{\_GFP\_ACCOUNT}. Otherwise, MANTA recursively
traces the use-def chain of the flag until it can confirm its accounting
bit flag. Although LLVM provides a value tracking analysis
pass [5] that can trace bit value propagation, the analysis is limited
to intra-procedural. To track inter-procedural accounting bits,
MANTA extends the pass with two analysis rules. Specifically, when
MANTA traces the parameters of a function, it follows into all the
caller functions to trace the values passed to the parameters; when
MANTA traces the return value of a call site, it also follows into the
callee functions and traces all possible returned values. If the
\texttt{\_GFP\_ACCOUNT} is set, MANTA marks the kernel memory as charged
at the allocation site. Otherwise, MANTA regards the memory as
not-charged even if the charging interfaces are in place.

The analysis on allocation from \texttt{kmem_cache} is slightly different,
as the allocation is also affected by the creation flag of \texttt{kmem_cache}. All allocation from a \texttt{kmem_cache} is accounted if the \texttt{kmem_cache}
is created with the \texttt{SLAB\_ACCOUNT} flag. Thus, for a \texttt{kmem_cache} re-
related allocation, MANTA also finds the initialization site of the
\texttt{kmem_cache} and adopts the same accounting flag analysis technique
to compute the \texttt{SLAB\_ACCOUNT} flag.

4.4 Dynamic Validation
Static analysis may have false positives. MANTA checks the static
reachability to system calls for each missing-account allocation and
filters out unreachable ones. However, statically reachable bugs are
not necessarily triggerable at runtime. MANTA thus further ana-
lyzes the triggerability of statically-detected bugs through dynamic
validation. Observing that Linux Test Project (LTP) [5] contains
test cases for all 300 system calls, we leverage these test cases to
examine the dynamical triggerability of the detected bugs. More
specifically, we first instrument the code to intercept each missing-
account allocation, so that we can confirm if it is actually reached.
Next, we run the sysexts and containers test suites (containing
1,469 test cases) of LTP to check whether the bug is triggered.

Moreover, we manually run existing tools or develop new test
cases to trigger the bugs that cannot be triggered by LTP. Some of
these bugs are closely related to specific kernel features and
cannot be triggered by general LTP test cases, e.g., kexec and selinux.
Therefore, we manually run related user-space tools to trigger them.
Others are due to specific syscall parameters uncovered by LTP and
we manually develop test cases to pass these parameters.

For the missing-account bugs that can be triggered dynamically,
we further develop the memory exhaustion proof-of-concept (PoC)
to assess their security risks. We develop the PoCs based on test
cases that trigger missing-account bugs. In particular, we repeated-
edly invoke syscalls that can trigger missing-account bugs in PoCs
and record the amount of the missing-account memory. More-
over, some missing-account allocations are subject to certain
constraints, such as the ulimit and sysctl variables. Without lack
of generality, we adopt the same constraints settings with cloud
services like Amazon Fargate [9]. The details of these PoCs will be
presented in §5.2.

4.5 Implementation
We implement MANTA as a pass of LLVM12 with 4K lines of
C++ code. The analyzed Linux kernel is v5.10 with the default
configuration for x86-64. MANTA uses vllvm [10] and Clang to
generate IR bitcode for the whole kernel with default configurations.
The bitcode size of the vmlinux is 481MB. MANTA uses the PeX [43,
46] approach to resolve indirect calls and generate the call graph.
With the proposed techniques, MANTA is able to finish the analysis
in about three minutes, making it scalable enough to be applied to
every Linux major release.

5 MANTA RESULTS
In this section, we first present analysis results of MANTA. Next,
we evaluate the precision and recall of MANTA. After that, we
present the impact analysis and the bugs that are reported and fixed
by Linux kernel community. Finally, we discuss the limitations of
MANTA.

5.1 Result Overview
MANTA detects 242 missing-account bugs that are statically reach-
able from 273 syscalls via 60,590 different paths. Specifically, the
number of userspace triggerable bugs is 162, among which 134 bugs
are triggered by LTP, 23 bugs are triggered by existing tools, and 5
bugs are triggered by manually developed test cases. The remaining
Table 2: PoCs of the 47 bugs. Mis. Mem is short for missing-accounted memory. Bug IDs are consistent with Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Related Syscalls</th>
<th>Bug IDs</th>
<th>Mis. Mem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>semget, semop</td>
<td>30-32</td>
<td>&gt;16GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>fcntl</td>
<td>20, 21</td>
<td>&gt;16GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>io_uring_setup, io_uring_register</td>
<td>8-19</td>
<td>&gt;16GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>prctl</td>
<td>33-35, 40, 41</td>
<td>&gt;16GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>add_key</td>
<td>51-53</td>
<td>&gt;16GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>fsopen</td>
<td>5-7</td>
<td>1167MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>io_uring_setup</td>
<td>8-13, 18, 19</td>
<td>835MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>perf_event_open</td>
<td>36, 37</td>
<td>801MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>timerfd_create, lock</td>
<td>20, 21, 28</td>
<td>441MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>timer_create</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>255MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>clone</td>
<td>23, 29, 38, 39, 43, 44, 46</td>
<td>231MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>epoll_create</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>165MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>bpf</td>
<td>33-35</td>
<td>116MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>timerfd_create</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>210MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>rt_sigqueueinfo</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>141MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>memfd_create</td>
<td>47, 48</td>
<td>192MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>eventfd</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>84MB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

80 bugs cannot be triggered and the failure of triggering mainly results from deep call paths (72 out of 80 cases). The rest 8 allocations are either explicitly marked as exempted in kernel documentation or for kernel internal usage. Note that the 72 non-triggered bugs are not all false positives, as our test cases only cover a portion of execution paths. Conservatively speaking, the precision of MANTA is greater than 66.9% (162/242).

We also evaluate the recall of MANTA by manually removing the accounting flags. More specifically, we first generate an evaluation set by removing existing accounting flags under kernel/ sub-directory. All affected allocation sites are collected in the evaluation set. In particular, we remove 11 SLAB_ACCOUNT flags and replace 5 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT with GFP_KERNEL in total, affecting 19 memory allocations, as shown in Table 1. We then run MANTA on the modified kernel code and the evaluation shows that MANTA can detect all 19 missing-account sites. Although the evaluated sites are limited, it still indicates that MANTA has a high recall rate. Additionally, MANTA does not find any redundant-account bugs.

5.2 Impact Analysis
As previously mentioned, to understand the impacts of the detected bugs, we further develop proof-of-concepts (PoCs) based on LTP test cases. More specifically, we have developed 17 PoCs, which cover 47 bugs can be repeatedly triggered from the user space, as shown in Table 2. We develop and test the PoCs on a QEMU x86_64 machine with 16GB RAM. The Linux distribution is Debian Buster with Linux kernel v5.10. All PoCs run in memcg confined environments and with the default set of capabilities applied by Docker runtimes [2]. Besides the PoC covered bugs, we did not develop PoCs for the other triggerable bugs due to the limit of time and our domain knowledge. However, these bugs may also be triggered repeatedly and reliably by the attacker who has corresponding domain knowledge.

These PoCs show that all of these 47 bugs can break memory account limits. The missing-account memory in these PoCs ranges from 100MB to over 16GB, indicating that these bugs in memcg allow the attacker to use memory for free or even launch memory exhaustion attacks. More specifically, 25 bugs covered by the first five PoCs can be exploited to memory exhaustion attacks to the host system. They can consume all the 16GB memory while only being accounted for much less amount. For example, PoC-1 exploits the Bug-30, which is shown in Figure 2 and discussed in §3.2. The function sem_alloc allocates sem_array objects without accounting flags, leading to Bug-30. In addition, all sem objects contained in a sem_array are not charged either. As a result, users are not charged for any kernel semaphores. Moreover, memory allocation affected by Bug-31 and 32 are used to maintain sem undo objects, so a user could also create such objects for free.

We use PoC-1 as an example to demonstrate that missing-account bugs can easily cause a system-wide DoS, which continues even after the attacking process is terminated. The PoC repeatedly calls semget to allocate 30,000 semaphore sets, with 30,000 semaphore instances in each set. For each set, PoC-1 further calls semop to create sem undo objects for it. As a result, even though each sem object takes a small amount of memory, all of these objects consume much more than 16GB of memory and cause DoS. Even worse, the memory is not freed after the PoC program is terminated because sem objects continue to exist, leading to the persistent DoS attack. The above PoC is practical under the default system configurations. The semaphore number is mainly limited by the sysctl variable kernel.sem, which allows 32,000 semaphore sets and 32,000 objects in each set by default. We use 30,000 for PoC-1. In sum, the attacker can easily turn a missing-account bug into a DoS attack.

5.3 Reporting to Linux Community
We have reported 53 bugs to the Linux kernel community, including all 47 bugs that can be triggered by 17 user space PoCs and 6 bugs that can be repeatedly triggered by kernel operations. The full list of these bugs is listed in Table 3 of appendix A.

Among all reported bugs, 37 of them have been confirmed by kernel developers. The patches for all of these 37 bugs are submitted, with 18 are already merged and 19 are pending to be merged. The patching process is slow because memcg subsystem does not maintain its git sub-tree currently. Thus memcg maintainers do not track submitted patches and expect that the patch authors will push the patches upstream via other subsystem maintainers. This introduces lots of extra discussions and reviews that slow down the merge process significantly.

When communicating with the kernel developers, we find that the kernel community are highly concerned about these bugs. One kernel developer stressed that memcg is "not just rough accounting estimation" and "unbound allocation which can be triggered by userspace should be accounted". Besides, kernel developers are very interested in MANTA and invited us to test their kernals using our tools and experiments.

5.4 Limitations
MANTA currently has the following limitations.
**Static analysis is not sound.** MANTA’s analysis can miss missing-account bugs due to path-insensitive function summaries. A function may not charge an allocated page in one of execution paths while it charges the page in another path. In this case, MANTA still summarizes the function as charged and misses missing-account bugs in later analysis. On the contrary, if MANTA summarizes the function as not-charged, it misses redundant-account bugs. In the future, we plan to adopt path-sensitive summaries like SATURN framework [40] to improve the soundness.

**Dynamic triggerable test is not complete.** Currently, MANTA uses LTP test cases to test whether a statically-detect bug can be triggered or not. The LTP test cases are limited. It is impossible for these test cases to cover all possible execution paths in the kernel. As a result, MANTA could miss some triggerable bugs due to the incomplete code coverage. Therefore, one of our future work is to develop more test cases and adopt fuzzing techniques to increase the code coverage.

### 6 RELATED WORK

In this section, we discuss existing works that are related to memory accounting and resource accounting.

#### 6.1 Memory Accounting

JRes [16] implements memory accounting interfaces for JVM. The memory accounting interfaces charge memory usage during object allocation and uncharge during garbage collection. However, JRes does not implement a recharging mechanism for shared objects. Price et al. [33] and MzScheme [38] propose consumer-based memory accounting schemes for user space run-time environment to account subtasks’ memory usage. They choose to charge memory usage to its actual users rather than to the memory allocators. They modify the runtime garbage collector so that it can uncharge an object before it is freed and recharge it to the entity that holds its references. However, they are hard to be directly adopted in kernel as implementing efficient enough garbage collecting in kernel remains a challenge. VM-based work provides better memory isolation and could resolve the per-process accounting problems in monolithic kernels. However, traditional VM-based schemes [1, 13, 25] are too heavy-weight and introduce high performance overhead. Unikernel-based methods [26, 29, 32, 44] achieve lower startup latency and higher through-puts but lack compatibility compared with container-based schemes [19, 35].

MANTA’s alloc-charging mapping analysis is similar to alloc-free mapping analysis used in memory leak detection. Leak Checker [40] uses a context- and path-sensitive analysis method to detect memory leaks. Saber [36] and FaskCheck [14] use on-demand sparse value-flow analysis to detect memory leaks. LeakFix [21] first tries to locate memory free that leads to leaks and fix it. AutoFix [41] detects and fixes memory leaks by combining static analysis and runtime checks. PCA [27] uses selective flow-sensitive algorithm to further speeds up inter-procedural data-flow analysis for memory leak detection. However, these work relies on either manual input or specific heuristic to decide allocation/free interface, which cannot be applied to identify memory accounting interfaces.

#### 6.2 Resource Accounting

Houdini’s escape [22] leverages kernel bottom-half worker threads, service processes, and interrupts to bypass confinement of control groups. However, it didn’t focus on memcg and didn’t analyze the implementation of control groups either. Compared with Houdini’s escape, our paper systematically defines possible problems in memcg and identify and report 53 bugs in memcg. Yang et al. proposes the concept of abstract resources and finds that exhausting these resources within containers lead to DoS attacks on host machines [42]. Resource container [12] proposes an OS-level abstraction to account for whole-system resource usage. It is the first work that describes the method to account general resources at the per-thread level. Compared to previous work, resource container works at system kernel and can account for resource consumption in kernel caused by user threads. Zhang et al. [45] proposed to charge CPU-time usage of kernel bottom-half processes to affected user processes to improve fairness.

Perez et al. [31] observes that EVM’s gas metering is not consistent with actual resource consumption, especially CPU cycles, on working nodes. It shows the actual inconsistency further increases when page cache works poorly, while the payer is charged for the same amount of gas. The paper also proposes a method to automatically synthesize payloads that can fully exploit the inconsistency. Liu et al. [28] finds the CPU time metering vulnerable on various real-world cloud platforms. They propose 6 attacks that could exploit CPU metering at process launch time or run time.

### 7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper, we conduct the first systematic analysis and detection against the Linux memory missing-account bugs. We perform an in-depth analysis to understand the exploitability and security impacts of the memory missing-account bugs on container platforms. Our analysis shows that all container runtimes, including both normal and secure runtimes, are vulnerable to memory exhaustion attacks resulting from missing-account bugs. Moreover, memory missing-account bugs can be exploited to attack the Docker, the CaaS, and the FaaS platforms, leading to the memory exhaustion, which crashes the node or even the whole cluster.

We then propose MANTA, which combines both static and dynamic analysis techniques to automatically detect memory missing-account bugs with both high code coverage and precision. Our detection tool reports 53 exploitable memory missing-account bugs, 37 of which were confirmed by kernel developers, two new CVEs are assigned. The result shows that MANTA effectively helps to mitigate missing-account problems in memory accounting systems. Our future work is to study how to account memory usage accurately without mediating all memory allocation/free paths.

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REFERENCES


A REPORTED BUGS

As shown in Table 3, we have reported 53 missing-account bugs to Linux community. 37 of them are confirmed by Linux community and the corresponding patches are submitted. The source location column indicates where the bugs reside in Linux kernel and function name indicates the functions that contain the bugs. Allocation interface indicates the missing-accounted memory allocation function. Triggered by indicates the syscalls that can trigger the missing-account bugs.
Table 3: Summary of 53 exploitable missing-account bugs. 37 bugs are confirmed by Linux kernel developers and the corresponding patches are submitted. Out of these patches, 18 are merged and 19 are pending for merging. While the other 16 bugs are pending to be confirmed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bug ID</th>
<th>Source location</th>
<th>Function name</th>
<th>Allocation interface</th>
<th>Triggered by</th>
<th>Confirm Status</th>
<th>Patch Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c:157</td>
<td>alloc_ldt_struct</td>
<td>kmalloc</td>
<td>clone</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>Merged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>fs/eventfd.c:417</td>
<td>do_eventfd</td>
<td>kmalloc</td>
<td>eventfd</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>fs/eventpoll.c:1014</td>
<td>ep_alloc</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>epoll_create</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>fs/fcntl.c:899</td>
<td>fasync_alloc</td>
<td>kmalloc</td>
<td>alloc_cache_alloc</td>
<td>fcntl</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>fs/fs_context.c:234</td>
<td>alloc_fs_context</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>fsopen</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>Merged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>fs/fs_context.c:634</td>
<td>legacy_init_fs_context</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>fsopen</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>Merged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>fs/fsopen.c:100</td>
<td>fscontext_alloc_log</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>fsopen</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>fs/io-wq.c:1093</td>
<td>io_qw_create</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>alloc_scm</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>fs/io-wq.c:1114</td>
<td>io_qw_create</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>alloc_scm</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>fs/io-uring.c:1180</td>
<td>io_ring_ctx_alloc</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>alloc_scm</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>fs/io-uring.c:1184</td>
<td>io_ring_ctx_alloc</td>
<td>kmem_cache_alloc</td>
<td>alloc_scm</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>fs/io-uring.c:1197</td>
<td>io_ring_ctx_alloc</td>
<td>kmem_cache_alloc</td>
<td>alloc_scm</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>fs/io-wq.c:7254</td>
<td>__io_sqe_files_scr</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>io_uring_register</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>fs/io-uring.c:7507</td>
<td>alloc_fixed_file_ref_node</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>io_uring_register</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>fs/io-uring.c:7546</td>
<td>__io_sqe_files_register</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>io_uring_register</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>fs/kernel/core.c:177</td>
<td>alloc_vfsmnt</td>
<td>kmem_cache_alloc</td>
<td>mount</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>Merged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>fs/kernel/core.c:3267</td>
<td>alloc_mnt_fs</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>clone</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>Pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>fs/network/group.c:121</td>
<td>fsnotify_alloc_group</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>inotify_init</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>Merged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>fs/notification/init.c:630</td>
<td>inotify_new_group</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>inotify_init</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>Merged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>fs/selection.c:658</td>
<td>core_sys_select</td>
<td>kvmalloc</td>
<td>select</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>Merged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>fs/signal/c:278</td>
<td>do_signalfd</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>signalfd</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>fs/signal/c:412</td>
<td>timerfd_create</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>timerfd_create</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>fs/timerfd.c:45</td>
<td>create_ipv6_socket</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>clone</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>Pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>fs/sem/block.c:514</td>
<td>sem_alloc</td>
<td>kvlalloc</td>
<td>semget</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>Merged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>fs/sem/block.c:1853</td>
<td>get_undo_list</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>semop</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>Merged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>fs/sem/block.c:1958</td>
<td>find_alloc undo</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>semor</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>Merged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>kernel/bpf/core.c:117</td>
<td>bpf_prog_alloc</td>
<td>alloc_perm_context</td>
<td>bpf, perf</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>Merged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>kernel/bpf/core.c:85</td>
<td>bpf_prog_alloc</td>
<td>alloc_perm_context</td>
<td>bpf, perf</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>Merged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>kernel/bpf/core.c:39</td>
<td>bpf_prog_alloc</td>
<td>alloc_perm_context</td>
<td>bpf, perf</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>Merged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>kernel/bpf/core.c:1142</td>
<td>perf_event_alloc</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>perf_event_open</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>kernel/bpf/core.c:4443</td>
<td>alloc_perm_context</td>
<td>kalloc</td>
<td>perf</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>kernel/bpf/core.c:56</td>
<td>create_namespace</td>
<td>kmem_cache_alloc</td>
<td>setns</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>Pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>kernel/bpf/core.c:90</td>
<td>create_pid_namespace</td>
<td>kmem_cache_alloc</td>
<td>clone</td>
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<td>kernel/bpf/core.c:1481</td>
<td>init_listener</td>
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<td>prctl</td>
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<td>kernel/bpf/core.c:565</td>
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<td>kernel/bpf/core.c:435</td>
<td>__allocate_allocation</td>
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<td>rt_stat</td>
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<td>kernel/bpf/core.c:435</td>
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<td>alloc_pfn</td>
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<td>mm/heap/hp64.c:868</td>
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<td>security/key/c:277</td>
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<td>security/key/c:381</td>
<td>key_user_lookup</td>
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